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Browsing by Author "Ward, Lee"

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    The Amending Formula, Meech Lake, and the Quebec Secession Reference: The Difficulties of Provincial Secession
    (Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Regina, 2011-11) Raymond, Jeffery Lee; Ward, Lee; Zhu, Yuchao; Blake, Raymond
    The Quebec Secession Reference, rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada,affirmed the position held by the Government of Canada, which claimed that a referendum on sovereignty is not a sufficient legal instrument, in of itself, to effect the removal of a province from the current constitutional order. The Reference also maintains that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order for the province to legally secede. Moreover, it is the opinion of the Court that a referendum on sovereignty is the formal consultation of the people, by their government, with the purpose of determining the province‟s democratic intent to remove itself from the Canadian Federation. However, a successful referendum on sovereignty does not constitutionally empower a province to amend the Constitution independent of the relevant institutions as defined in the amending formula. In fact, the Court informs us that while a referendum on sovereignty is the expression of the democratic will of the people within that given province, it does not allow for the exclusion of the extra-provincial stakeholders within the Canadian federation. This thesis endeavours to understand, in detail and overall scope, the various legal options and limitations available to a province seeking to remove itself from the Canadian Federation. Central to this understanding is the assumption that provincial secession may only be achieved by way of a constitutional amendment, and that a unilateral declaration of independence is not within the jurisdictional power of any provincial legislature on its own. This thesis demonstrates the amending formula is the primary deterrent to any secessionist plan. Therefore, in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the constitutional impediments to secession, and to legitimate the position that the amending formula is the primary secession deterrent, this paper will attempt to delineate the relevant jurisdictional capacities of both the provincial and federal governments during a potential secession process. In order to determine why the question of secession was presented to the Supreme Court in the first place, it is necessary to provide a historical overview and a synoptic review of the Constitutional patriation process, the Meech Accord, the 1995 Quebec Referendum, and the Quebec Secession Reference. These events are critical to understanding why Quebec has demonstrated uneasiness with the idea of Canada as shared by the rest of the country. After presenting the historical overview, an examination of the legal difficulties associated with provincial secession will follow. In addition, the actions and statements of the political actors during the Reference will be examined in order to comprehend the motives of both secessionists and federalists. Finally, we will determine that political action has forced Canada to discuss and examine the legality of this issue. This paper will weigh the legal practicalities involving a referendum result that requires the governments of both Canada and the province of Quebec to negotiate terms regarding secession and whether a consensus would likely follow. Ultimately, the Canadian Constitution and its amending formula provides for the possibility of provincial secession, however, political consensus on the terms of secession would be extremely difficult to achieve. It is also possible the constitutional acceptance of Quebec as a distinct society would have avoided the threat of a secession process altogether.
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    Comparing Hobbes's Gratitude and Aristotle's Magnanimity
    (Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Regina, 2018-07) Djoboulian, Taline; Elliott, David; Ward, Lee; Doran, Ryan; Dupeyron, Bruno
    Hobbes's natural law of gratitude needs to be brought back into perspective when reading his political works. Often when reading Hobbes, many use his depiction of human nature and natural rights to demonstrate the innate propensity toward unsociability. However, contrary to this presumption, Hobbes presents a collectivist dimension to his argument even within the state of nature. The natural law of gratitude demonstrates the importance of preserving sociability and collectivity. In both On the Citizen and Leviathan, gratitude creates and sustains sociability with utility-based friendships. Gratitude is preserved best in a monarchy, because it secures covenants that rely on gratitude; it secures voluntary action; and is rooted in natural equality. Hobbes's natural law of gratitude was influenced by Aristotle's virtue of magnanimity and friendships that accompany virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics. However, Hobbes would problematize Aristotle’s magnanimous person (or the great-souled man) because they reject gratitude for their benefactions on the account that nothing seems great to them. Furthermore, the great-souled man worries that they may be perceived as a member of the inferior class which lowers their self-esteem that allows for their great benefactions. It will be argued that gratitude is needed to form the collective, and it is best preserved in Hobbes’s monarchy. For monarchy is rooted in natural equality, while timocracy is rooted in inequality.
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    Locke's Political Metaphysics
    (Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Regina, 2017-12) Calfas, Kostantinos; Ward, Lee; Piercey, Robert; Smith, Travis
    Locke’s achievements in political theory have traditionally been viewed in isolation from his metaphysical and epistemological accomplishments. Consequently, many deformations of Locke’s view of the former and the latter have manifested; principal among these is the notion of an atheist and materialist Locke. The goal of the proceeding study is to show how in what I’ve termed, Locke’s “political metaphysics” we see the emergence of a politics that is a consequence of his metaphysical commitments to human beings as free persons. That freedom is understood by Locke, not merely positively, in what one does, or can be seen by others as being free to do, but negatively, as possibilities, beliefs or attitudes withheld. This is to say that, for Locke, human beings must be understood not merely by what is scrutable in the material or natural properties, but in their capacity to withhold their thoughts, desires, potential from the world. As the consequence of this withholding, an attitude of political toleration is necessitated by the nature of human beings as free persons as one can never be sure their assessments of another in their natural ostensible state reflects the totality of who they are. Moreover, because human beings can make and value things abstracted from the natural world, one is unable to absolutely value the work of human beings based on entirely on the assessments of another. Thus, Locke ingeniously deploys a skepticism and particularist metaphysics that resists the attempts to put people into groups and to impose normative categories on those groups which has been the source of so much political violence. Rather than seek, what Greg Forster once attributed to Locke as “moral consensus” Locke shows how the inscrutable nature of the human mind resists such consensus and demands that all government defer to the free person.
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    The Political Philosophy and Historical Origins of the Second Amendment to the US Constitution
    (Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Regina, 2014-01) Schneider, Thomas James; Ward, Lee; Farney, James; Flood, Dawn
    The Second Amendment to the US Constitution states that a well regulated militia and the right of the people to bear arms are necessary for the security of a free state. What were the philosophical and historical origins of this hallmark of American freedom? What was the ‘militia’ understood to mean for the founding generation of Americans? How have the courts and legislatures of the United States played a role in shaping the outcome of this right? The right to bear arms is derived from a graduation of historical ideas that culminated in the American War for Independence. It is my contention that both republican and liberal influences over the course of European (primarily English) philosophical and legal history propelled the Americans to try to secure arms and militias through the Second Amendment. These two social institutions, the republican militia and the liberal democratic access to arms, are not mutually exclusive and in fact support one another. The American militia was intended as a states-centric defensive military unit. The militia was also primarily intended to quell internal disturbances and provide an outlet by which moral virtue was achieved via a martial and engaged citizenry. The courts have recently been concerned with the historical meaning of the Second Amendment as a means of properly deciding cases. Laws are being challenged and legal precedents reversed as a result of a wider understanding of where and why this right came into existence. These cases have had a long lasting impact upon American citizens and political scientists alike. I utilized a variety of primary and secondary resources, delving deep into American and European history. It was only after a clear theme emerged that I was able to determine where in fact the Second Amendment originated and explore the nuances of the law, its philosophical underpinnings and legal ramifications. The Second Amendment as a concept and as an institution has been tested in American history – this was examined and explained. A free citizen is to be an armed citizen, capable of defending his freedom via a well-regulated militia.
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    SIPP Policy Dialogue Number 18 Spring 2008
    (Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, 2008) MacIvor, Heather; Bell, Patricia; Norman, Ken; Whyte, John D.; Ward, Lee; Marchildon, Gregory P.; Marshall, Jim; Conway, John; Rocan, Claude; Martens, Patricia J.; Kluger, Joseph; Hedlund, Dave
    Last issue, I reflected a little on the meaning of the word “dialogue.” Trying to define the word “policy” much less reflecting on its deeper meanings and nuances is much more difficult in part because almost every policy practitioner has his or her own intuitive or common sense definition of the word. Scholars have hardly helped matters. I have seen entire books on public policy in which the authors do not once attempt to define what they mean by policy. This can cause serious problems in conversations about what constitutes effective public policy. We end up arguing in circles hardly realizing that our definitions of “policy” are at least partially incompatible. The stakes are high for those charged with the responsibility to initiate and implement public policy today. They are also high for those of us in the business of judging the past, keeping in mind that we ultimately assess governments on their public policy legacies – that is, what individual administrations have bequeathed to subsequent generations.
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    Toward a New Paradigm for Humanitarian Intervention
    (Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, 2007-04) Ward, Lee
    The current debate over humanitarian intervention is characterized by the twofold tension between the UN Charter restrictions on the use of force and more permissive customary norms, on the one hand, and competing claims of national sovereignty and human rights protection, on the other. This paper proposes a new paradigm for humanitarian intervention that builds upon the concept of the "Responsibility to Protect" articulated by the Canadian inspired International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and recommends the extension of this principle to a multidimensional strategy for codifying humanitarian intervention in international law. At the heart of this codification proposal is a call for Canada to employ its diplomatic expertise to facilitate the negotiation of an International Convention on the Right and Responsibility of Humanitarian Intervention that would move the international community a considerable distance toward harmonizing international humanitarian law and the UN Charter system.

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