Tentativeness and Permeability in the Poitical Thought of Hannah Arendt

Abstract

Hannah Arendt’s distinction between public and private rests upon a distinction between freedom and necessity that many have argued is ontological and thus immutable. This essay disputes that interpretation by discussing the tentative foundations of Arendt’s work on history and the human condition, in order to argue that this distinction stems not from a phenomenological essentialism but rather a meditation on historical forms of living-together that explicitly rejects notions of human nature and causality in history. This tentativeness stems from what Arendt regarded as the disastrous tendency of philosophy to systematize the chaos and disorder of human affairs, so that Arendt claims that the role of political theory is not to preclude or supersede political debate and deliberation, but rather to “think what we are doing.” This interpretation of Arendt’s thought is supported by her shift towards the Roman republic and praise of grassroots political councils, as well as her notions of understanding and judgment as they are reflected in her writings. Ultimately it is shown that freedom and necessity in human affairs are not absolute categories beyond amendment, but two halves of a fluid distinction that is only valid in an inevitably tentative and incomplete hindsight. This has significant implications both for contemporary interpretations of Arendt’s thought and for the politicization of social issues.