During the Vietnam War, the United States launched a psychological warfare campaign that was unprecedented in size and scope for US military forces. Numerous programs were launched by the US in conjunction with the South Vietnamese government, with the goal of weakening North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) forces, by either lowering soldier morale, or inducing defections. The most prominent psychological program launched was the Chiêu Hồi program, which helped foster the defection of over 194,000 North Vietnamese forces. Despite this notable reduction of forces over the life of the program, from 1963 to 1971, it has been debated whether or not this program could be deemed a success. This thesis looks at government documentation periodically tracking defections as well as cost to the program, studies and interviews collected by the RAND Corporation during the Vietnam war, and other key primary and secondary sources recounting the morale of soldiers on both sides, to argue that despite the limitations of the Chiêu Hồi program and the challenges it faced, it was a notable success overall.